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DOES TRADE TRUMP LAW IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS? INTERNATIONAL TRADE, LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH KOREA
International relations have become categorically dependent on the sophisticated
trading systems that interconnect and empower sovereign states. Thus, a state’s
focus on protecting the rights of its individuals comprising and affected by that
system would appear to come secondary to the economic decisions involved in
conducting trade agreements. This article asks whether the international trade
regime can be used to further the protection of human rights or whether such
protection should be better left in the hands of legal entities in international bodies
and sovereign states. I analyze South Korea and South Africa’s legal and trade
regimes—two of the world’s largest and most integrated economies and two
countries with remarkably different development histories—to underscore the
responsibility of governments in their international transactions and domestic
relations and to outline the future role and mandate of the world’s most
significant international institutions.
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INTRODUCTION

On November 16, 2015, in Geneva, Switzerland, the
United Nations held its annual three-day “Forum on Business
and Human Rights” that brought together over 2,000
participants from all over the world—including executives of
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international business organizations, government officials,
experts in trade, nongovernmental organizations, and
interested third parties—to discuss the intersection of
business and human rights.1 The goal of the forum was to
tease out how the respect of human rights could become
“fashionable” in the business world. According to Arancha
Gonzalez, Executive Director of the International Trade
Centre, “fashion [itself] can be a means to address human
rights.”2 Across the world in New York City, a few months
before the forum, Pope Francis declared that “[e]conomic and
social exclusion is a complete denial of human fraternity and
a grave offense against human rights”.3 These two events
echo growing sentiment in recent years that human rights,
though theoretically respected in serious international
agreements, are continuously threatened by the pace and
depth of globalization.
All of the players gathered at the United Nations
conference interact on the stage of the international political
economy, the integrated international system of economics
that is categorically propelled by the politics of the countries
who interact in the business world. Given that the
international political economy is inherently driven by
economic theories of interest and comparative advantage, it
and the actors interacting in it (that is, trading with one

Making Human Rights Fashionable, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R
(Nov._19,_2015),_http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Mak
inghumanrightsfashionable.aspx.
2 Id.
3 Pope Francis, Meeting with the Members of the General Assembly of the
United Nations Organization: Address of the Holy Father, THE HOLY SEE
(Sept._25,_2015),_http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches
/2015/september/documents/papa-francesco_20150925_onu-visita.pdf.
1
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another) have facilitated the creation of winners and losers in
the system: parties who either benefit greatly or lose greatly
from these interactions. Human rights often tend to be the
biggest loser in this system.
A case-in-point that demonstrates the vulnerability of
the human actors who perpetuate the existence of the
international political economy would be the 2013 disaster at
Rana Plaza in Bangladesh.4 Rana Plaza was one of the largest
clothing factories operating in Bangladesh, in which fashion
brands such as Benetton, El Corte Inglés, Mango, and
Walmart manufactured merchandise for their stores around
the world.5 The building collapsed in April 2013 due to
structural inadequacies, a lack of appropriate surveillance
and inspection, overcrowding, and overworking: “poor

Jason Burke, Bangladesh Factory Collapse Leaves Trail of Shattered Lives, THE
GUARDIAN_(June_6,_2013),_http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013
/jun/06/bangladesh-factory-building-collapse-community.
5 See Clare O’Connor, “Extreme Pricing” At What Cost? Retailer Joe Fresh
Sends Reps to Bangladesh as Death Toll Rises, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2013),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2013/04/30/extremepricing-at-what-cost-retailer-joe-fresh-sends-reps-to-bangladesh-asdeath-toll-rises/#6b7cc3825b83; Steven Greenhouse, Major Retailers Join
Bangladesh_Safety_Plan,_N.Y._TIMES_(May_13,_2013),_http://www.nyti
mes.com/2013/05/14/business/global/hm-agrees-to-bangladeshsafety-plan.html; Steve Robson, Miracle Survivor of Bangladesh Factory
Collapse Changed into Clothes of Her Dead Colleague Before Being Rescued: 19Year-Old who Lived off Water from Dripping Pipe for 17 Days Emerged from
Ruins in a Mauve Wrap and Pink Scarf, DAILYMAIL.COM (May
10,_2013),_http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2322391/Bangladesh-survivor-Reshma-Akhter-changed-deadcolleagues-clothes-trapped-rubble.html; and Steven Greenhouse, As Firms
Line Up on Factories, Wal-Mart Plans Solo Effort, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/business/six-retailers-joinbangladesh-factory-pact.html?pagewanted=all.
4
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construction and a lack of oversight.”6 More importantly, it
was, in some ways, the result of “a growing global desire for
more cheap fashion” to profit the big companies.7 The more
workers could be crammed into a building, and the less the
building needed to be inspected for building code violations,
and the less the machines and humans working them needed
to stop working for improvements to the building structure,
the more big businesses profited from cheap labor in selling
cheap fashion. Though progress has been made to improve
factory conditions in all of Bangladesh over the past four
years, there is still much room to improve the whole of the
garment industry in general. This includes simply reforming
the structures of factories, but more importantly, reform
involves pushing responsibility for human rights onto both
small and large players in trade. More broadly, this highlights
the critical role that economics, trade, and law can play in the
protection against human rights violations all over the world.
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) is, today, the
mammoth international body for matters of trade, economic
relations, and the international political economy. It was
established in 1994, following the Uruguay Round
negotiations of the previous international institution for
international trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. The Marrakesh Agreement that established the WTO
states in its preamble that the parties to the agreement
(members of the WTO) recognize “that their relations in the

6 Amy Westervelt, Two Years after Rana Plaza, Have Conditions Improved in
Bangladesh’s
Factories?,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
24,
2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/2015/apr/24/bangladesh-factories-building-collapse-garmentdhaka-rana-plaza-brands-hm-gap-workers-construction.
7 Id.
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field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted
with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real
income.”8 Some success has been met in this endeavor. More
generally however, the success of the WTO in general in
subsequent years has ushered in an era where consumers are
conscience of the international reach that their purchases have
and of the extent to which their currency helps the employees
of the biggest businesses in the world. Consumers are
motivated to demand fair and free trade.9 Quite simply then,
one can venture to say that the WTO has set out
internationally recognized obligations and objectives to
protect the economic, social, and cultural rights of human
beings.10 Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations
from 1997 to 2006, himself has warned that the “failure to act
on human rights . . . will undermine the credibility of the
global trading system.”11
In international law, since the establishment of the
United Nations (“the U.N.”) in 1945, human rights have been
at the forefront of international geopolitical concern—in
theory, if not in practice. The Preamble to Charter of the U.N.

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
9 Cephas Lumina, Free Trade or Just Trade? The World Trade Organisation,
Human Rights, and Development (Part 1), 12 L., DEMOCRACY & DEV. 20, 2628 (2008) (defining fair trade as a regulating mechanism in trade that is
formulated to achieve “justice” in economics, and defining free trade as a
regulating mechanism in trade that concerns itself with achieving
“justice” in human rights).
10 Id. at 33. See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and
Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 19, 24 (2002).
11 Lumina, supra note 9, at 28.
8
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starts with the reaffirmation of “faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small.”12 The body was established with an eye to “promote
social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”:
to promote progress in human rights and establish longlasting institutions that would protect human rights.13 Going
even further, when the 1948 U.N. General Assembly adopted
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), it laid
out that this hortatory declaration was understood to be “a
common standard of achievements for all peoples and all
nations.”14
Where the protection of human rights has found most
support has been in the international declarations, guiding
principles, and general international law that have come after
the U.N. and UDHR in the 1940s. One can argue that the

U.N. Charter preamble.
Id.; See also id. art. 1-2 (elaborating on the purpose of the United Nations
as an international body and the responsibilities and principles of its
members in achieving this higher respect and protection of human rights);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976) (the
covenant proposed by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights and adopted by the U.N. General Assembly defining humans’ civil
and political rights and laying out the responsibilities of governments in
the protection of these rights); International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) (the covenant proposed by the Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights and adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly defining humans’ economic, social, and cultural rights
and laying out the responsibilities of governments in the protection of
these rights).
14 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948).
12
13
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UDHR itself has become customary international law in
subsequent years; it encapsulates erga omnes obligations:
“those obligations binding on all states and in whose
observance all states have a legal interest.”15 First, this is
underscored by the fact that human rights standards
themselves seem to “have achieved the status of jus cogens”—
of “preemptory norm[s] of general international law”—
because of rather-recent international judicial opinions that
underscore the incontrovertible primacy and irrefutability of
human rights.16 Second, the erga omnes status of the UDHR
finds support in the fact that experts in human rights,
international law, and trade have recognized the
responsibility of governments 1) to protect their citizens from
mass atrocities (only if they cannot first prevent the mass
atrocities) and 2) to help other states that do not have the
capacity or willingness to do the same.17 Briefly, governments
have a “responsibility to protect” (“R2P”).

15 See Lumina, supra note 9, at 31-32 (proposing that the principles in the
UDHR are binding on any significant player in the international political
economy).
16 See id., supra note 9, at 34 n.83 (listing a few international judicial
opinions from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that
have underscored the primacy of human rights); See also Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(stating that treaties drafted in conflict with general international
preemptory norms are void).
17 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time has
Come…and Gone?, 22 INT’L REL. 283, 285 (2008); Alex Bellamy, R2P – Dead
or Alive?, in RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT – FROM EVASIVE TO RELUCTANT
ACTION? 11, 15-16 (Malte Brosig ed., Hans Seidel Foundation, Institute for
Security Studies, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, South African Institute of
International Affairs 2012).
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Gareth Evans, a key figure in the development and
adoption of R2P as a principle, describes it as an international
norm because it is a principle which touches on “our common
humanity.”18 Indeed, the concept was unanimously adopted
at the 2005 U.N. World Summit. For this reason, Evans
believes it is a universal concept that supersedes states’
nationalistic, realpolitik interests; to a certain extent, he argues,
it is or should be logically understood as an integral part of
states’ nationalistic, realpolitik interests. Alex Bellamy, another
key figure in the development of R2P, explains that as the
norm becomes more central to the way the international
community functions and responds to the challenges of
human rights violations, its implementation in differing
contexts becomes more and more complex.19 Nevertheless, or
because of that very challenge of increasing complexity, R2P
as a guiding principle for sovereign governance evolves, is
strengthened, and moves to the forefront of the international
conversation on law, policy, trade, and geopolitical and geoeconomical
governance.20
Significantly,
R2P
rests
fundamentally on customary and written international law; it
is nothing new.21
R2P finds an important extension in the U.N.’s
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The very
contents of the document are divided into “the state[’s] duty
to protect human rights” and “the corporate responsibility to
respect human rights”—and includes an “access to remedy”

Evans, supra note 17, at 298.
Bellamy, supra note 17, at 13.
20 Bellamy, supra note 17, at 22-24.
21 Bellamy, supra note 17, at 16.
18
19

2018 DOES INTERNATIONAL TRADE TRUMP HUMAN RIGHTS

307

for parties whose rights have been violated.22 The extension
of R2P into the realm of corporate responsibility is incredibly
significant given that, generally, only states are responsible
for their corporations’ extraterritorial violations of
international human rights law.23 That is to say, given that
“human rights treaty obligations are generally understood as
falling on States only,”24 companies and corporations often
escape liability for their international human rights
violations. They cannot be tried in courts under international
law.25 Thus, there is a gap in the jurisprudence of international
courts. However, “economists increasingly emphasize the
important role of legal institutions in economic growth,”
giving the world of human rights hope that such institutions
could have a profound, positive impact.26
International trade, law, and human rights can be
complimentary, and the growth of one helps, and in fact,
directly leads to the growth of the other.27 There is

Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, included in the final
report to the Human Rights Council of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General, at iii, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (June 16, 2011).
23 Robert McCorquodale and Penelope Simons, Responsibility beyond
Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of
International Human Rights Law, 70 MODERN L. REV. 598, 601 (2007).
24 Frequently Asked Questions About the Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights, U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FAQ_PrinciplesBussi
nessHR.pdf.
25 McCorquodale and Simons, supra note 23, at 598.
26 Frank B. Cross, The Relevance of Law in Human Rights Protection, 19 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 87, 88 (1999).
27 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Trade Law:
Defining and Connecting the Two Fields, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
22
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“foundational substance in international trade law that can be
interpreted to support the protection of human rights.”28 This
article sets out to demonstrate that both trade and law can
work in tandem for the protection of human rights in every
country around the world.
The next section in the article will elaborate on the twopronged method of analysis for this study that will illuminate
the ways in which trade and law can complement each other
in the system of establishing human rights protections.
II.

METHOD OF ANALYSIS IN THE ARTICLE

As this article comparatively investigates how trade
regimes and legal regimes impact the protection of human
rights,29 I will first conduct a purely statistical analysis
tracking South Korea’s and South Africa’s trade regime
growth and how it has affected their human rights outcome.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE 29, 29-34 (Thomas Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn, &
Elisabeth Bürgi, eds., 2005); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights,
International Economic Law and “Constitutional Justice,” 19 EUR. J. INT’L L.
769, 773 (2008).
28 Abadir M. Ibrahim, International Trade and Human Rights: An Unfinished
Debate, 14 HEINONLINE GER. L. J. 321, 331(2013). See also Cross, supra note
26, at 95, for the proposition that “the presence of an express constitutional
protection still has no significant effect on the actual protection of
constitutional rights.”
29 I limit my interpretation of “human rights” to the U.N.’s Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights’ interpretation: “rights inherent to
all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex,
national or ethnic origin, color, religion, language, or any other status. . . .
These rights are interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.” What Are
Human Rights?, UNITED NATIONS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUM._RTS.,_http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHuman
Rights.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
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I thus employ two variables for this analysis: an independent
and a dependent variable. 30 The two variables will track the
growth of trade in a country and the human rights outcome.
The independent variable, representative of a
country’s trade regime, is “trade agreements.” I use the World
Trade Organization’s (“WTO’s”) definition of trade
agreement for my study: “measures, policies, or laws” that a
country enacts having to do with trade in and out of that
country.31 This includes regional trade agreements (e.g., the
North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement), multilateral trade
agreements, and bilateral trade agreements the country has
been involved in from 1995 to 2014, the WTO’s first eleven
years of formal operation.32
The dependent variable in this analysis is the country’s
human rights record, representing the country’s human
rights protection regime. I use Freedom House’s Freedom in
the World report to measure this variable: I chose to employ

30 I include certain control variables in the analysis as well, but refrain from

extensive explanation of the variables for the sake of clarity and space.
These control variables are 1) regime type (democracy), 2) GDP per capita,
percent annual growth, 3) GDP per capita, current USD, 4) labor unrest
(strikes and lockouts), and 5) economic complexity.
31 Trade Policy Reviews: Ensuring Transparency, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm11_e.ht
m (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
32 I operationalize “trade agreements” by drawing on records from the
WTO and governments’ foreign affairs websites from the years 1995 to
2014. The number inputted into my data set corresponds to the number of
trade agreements in operation for the country in question at the specific
year in time, noting that these are the agreements conducted outside of
membership of the WTO.
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the data set (along with its coding methods) for each country
for the same time period: from 1995 to 2014.33
I use a simple regression model because of the physical
limits of this paper, but I argue that it is representative and
foolproof enough to have its outcomes respected. A
regression model correlates one set of data with another
specified set of data, detailing the specific correlation that one
can make between the two. The statistics of significance that
it puts out are an x-variable coefficient, a P-value, and a lower
and upper 95% confidence variable. The x-variable coefficient
is the “slope” of the correlation, the mean, and thus it signifies
how well the two sets of data in question can be correlated.
The P-value denotes the percent of error from 100 for which
you can say your data is accurate. The lower and upper 95%
confidence variables are the two x-variable points between
which 95% of the x-variable coefficient correlation lies.
Using a simple regression analysis, I hope to find a
negative correlation among the data. Specifically, the best

Specifically, I look at the score given for a country’s “civil liberties
rating.” The Freedom House Freedom in the World data set defines a civil
liberty as “freedoms of expression, assembly, association, education, and
religion. [The state has] an established and generally fair legal system that
ensures the rule of law . . . allow[s] free economic activity, and tend[s] to
strive for equality of opportunity for everyone, including women and
minority groups.” Methodology: Freedom in the World 2016, FREEDOM
HOUSE,_https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world2016/methodology (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). Using this definition, the
analysts compiling the Freedom in the World report decide on “Civil
Liberties Rating” by looking at news articles, academic analyses, reports
from nongovernmental organizations, and individual professional
contacts. The analyst then assigns a total score based on this information,
ranging from 1 (“the greatest degree of freedom”) to 7 (“the smallest
degree of freedom”).
33
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outcome would be that the “human rights record” score
decreases (i.e., protection of political rights and civil liberties
improves) with an increase in the number of trade agreements
a country signs on to. The negative correlation would signal
that trade can be a proper vehicle to implement significant
protections for human rights.
After quantitatively evaluating South Africa and South
Korea’s economic development and tracking it with each
country’s human rights outcome, I move to qualitatively
investigate the historical, economic, and social development
of both countries. The purpose of moving to a second analysis
is to complement the rather-limited statistical analysis I
conduct in the first part of the paper. A more thorough
discussion of these limitations is included below. Through the
case study analysis, I will investigate each country’s history
of economic development, trade relations, legal regime,
governmental evolution, societal composition, and societal
relations. I will “examine particular issues or phenomena in
two . . . countries with the express intention of comparing
their manifestations in different socio-cultural settings
(institutions, customs, traditions, value systems, life styles,
language, thought patterns), using the same research
instruments.”34 This will allow me to extrapolate the results
to other comparatively similar countries–with similar
political, economic, and social conditions–and to draw
significant policy and legal recommendations for those
classes of countries.
The next section in the article lays out the statistical
outputs for South Africa and South Korea and the
implications of these results for the rest of the study.

34

ALAN BRYMAN, SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS 58 (3rd ed. 2008).
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STATISTICAL OUTPUTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH
KOREA

Figure 1 and 2 below tabulate the data collected for
South Africa and South Korea, respectively, from 1995 to
2014.
Figure 1 South Africa
Year

Trade
Agreeme
nts

HR
record

Regime
type

GDP per
capita,
current
USD

1

GDP per
capita,
%
annual
growth
0.89

Labor
unrest

Economi
c
complexi
ty

1995

2

2

1996

2

2

3973.93

315

0.30

1

2.00

3690.18

901

0.34

1997

2

2

1

1998

2

2

1

0.28

3728.33

1324

0.38

-1.84

3288.20

527

0.41

1999

4

2

1

2000

6

2

1

-0.04

3183.15

107

0.37

1.65

3099.13

80

0.44

2001

6

2

1

0.62

2705.78

83

0.04

2002

6

2

1

2.25

2535.49

47

0.05

2003

6

2

1

1.65

3799.44

62

0.16

2004

6

2

1

3.21

4892.04

49

0.15

2005

6

2

1

3.90

5444.08

102

0.13

2006

6

2

1

4.17

5660.12

99

0.10

2007

6

2

1

3.92

6153.66

75

0.14

2008

8

2

1

1.75

5811.62

57

0.11

2009

8

2

1

-2.94

5912.14

51

0.29

2010

8

2

1

1.55

7389.96

74

0.25

2011

8

2

1

1.69

8080.87

67

-0.18

2012

8

2

1

0.68

7592.16

99

0.19

2013

8

2

1

0.64

6889.79

114

0.32

2014

8

2

1

-0.06

6482.82

88

..
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Figure 2 South Korea
Year

Trade
Agreeme
nts

HR
record

Regime
type

GDP per
capita,
current
USD

1

GDP per
capita,
%
annual
growth
7.84

1995

0

2

1996

0

2

1997

0

2

1998

0

2

1999

0

2000

0

2001
2002

12403.91

88

0.99

1

6.17

13254.64

85

1.01

1

4.78

12196.77

78

0.97

1

-6.39

8133.73

129

0.94

2

1

9.95

10432.21

198

1.03

2

1

7.93

11947.58

250

1.09

0

2

1

3.75

11255.95

235

1.39

0

2

1

6.84

12788.58

322

1.46

2003

1

2

1

2.42

14219.19

320

1.50

2004

1

2

1

4.51

15921.94

462

1.63

2005

4

2

1

3.71

18657.52

287

1.66

2006

4

2

1

4.67

20917.03

138

1.64

2007

4

2

1

4.97

23101.51

115

1.49

2008

4

2

1

2.09

20474.89

108

1.49

2009

5

2

1

0.23

18338.71

121

1.56

2010

5

2

1

6.00

22151.21

86

1.64

2011

7

2

1

2.91

24155.83

65

1.80

2012

8

2

1

1.83

24453.97

105

1.70

2013

8

2

1

2.46

25997.88

72

1.70

2014

8

2

1

2.89

27970.50

111

..

Figure 3 tabulates the regression model outputs from the data.

Figure 3 Regression model outputs
Unit of
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0
0

Pvalue

Lower
95%

Upper
95%

#NUM!

0

0
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0

0
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Both South Africa and South Korea’s statistical outputs
are incredibly significant, because the data shows that there is
no correlation between the two variables–trade agreements
and human rights record–whatsoever. That is to say,
regardless of the number of free trade agreements that the
government has entered into over the years, and despite the
fluctuations in the control variables, each country’s human
rights record has not changed.
Looking at South Africa, South Africa has maintained
a constant, higher-than average human rights record as
reported by Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report (the
average being 3.5, with ratings possible out of 1 to 7), despite
the increasing number of free trade agreements since 1995.
Below I list the control variables for further inspection:








CV1. According to Freedom House, South
Africa has been considered an electoral
democracy since 1995.
CV3. Its GDP per capita has almost doubled
over the past 11 years (from $3973.93 to
$6482.82).
CV4. The amount of labor unrest has
significantly decreased from a high of 1324 in
1997 to 88 strikes or lockouts reported in 2014.
CV5. And its economic complexity has
remained virtually unchanged, with an average
of 0.21 and a standard deviation of 0.16 over the
11 years investigated.

Given that these control variables do not quite explain
the reason for South Africa’s 0 x-variable coefficient, I argue
that more sophisticated quantitative data is needed to make a
definitive study of the human rights situation in the country
since the end of apartheid in 1994. For this reason, I will
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conduct an investigation into the history of the country, its
politics, its economic development, and the particular trade
relations it has had since 1995, as reported by the WTO and
other academic journals. I hope to discover the reasons why
trade agreements have had no effect on the human rights
outcomes of South African people.
Looking at South Korea, South Korea has remained
relatively free with a constant, higher-than-average human
rights record (the dependent variable) as reported by
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report (the average
being 3.5, with ratings possible out of 1 to 7). When looking at
the control variables, one can see that:







CV1. Regime type has remained constant – since
1995, South Korea has been considered an
electoral democracy.
CV3. GDP per capita has more than doubled:
$12,403.91 in 1995 versus $27,970.50 in 2014.
CV4. The amount of labor unrest has fluctuated,
with high variance, but went back down to a
relatively low number in 2014 (111 strikes and
lockouts), the average being 168.75 and the
standard deviation 108.9939.
CV5. Economic complexity has remained
somewhat the same, with an average of 1.41,
and a standard deviation of 0.30.

Because there is such significant variance in the control
variables, I move to study South Korea in a qualitative
analysis. Looking at the Republic of Korea’s history in the 20th
century, trade activity since 1995 as reported by the WTO, and
a variety of scholarly articles discussing the development of
the economy and human rights norms in South Korea, I hope
to find why the level of human rights protections in the
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country has remained virtually unchanged over the past 11
years.
Generally, though the study’s results are illuminating,
it is important to note that there is a rather significant
limitation in this analysis, namely the lack of sophisticated
quantitative human rights data. There exist many precedents
with regards to quantifying human rights violations, but
there are strides yet to be made within this particular
practice.35 For this reason, the correlation between my
independent and dependent variables is not entirely
demonstrative. There is a great need for more sophisticated
data, rather than just a whole number estimation of a “human
rights record.” However, for reasons of time, scope, and
feasibility, I was not be able to remedy this situation to any
extent for my own study. On the other hand, qualitative
studies, though less systematized, are necessary for a more
dynamic understanding of “outlier” countries’ particular
historical developments. The next section dives in to a greater
analysis of these countries, using historical documents, legal
documents, scholarly articles, and news reports.
IV.

QUALITATIVE CASE STUDIES, SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH
KOREA

This section will qualitatively analyze the social,
economic, and legal development of South Africa and South
Korea, respectively. The analysis will focus on attempting to
reconcile the results of the quantitative analysis above—
showing no correlation between economic development and

TODD LANDMAN & EDZIA CARVALHO, MEASURING HUMAN RIGHTS
(2010).

35
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growing protection for human rights—with each country’s
complex historical and legal record.
First, I begin with South Africa and then go on to study
South Korea. Briefly, and without failing to acknowledge that
much of the following was achieved after immense political
and social strife, South Africa was colonized by the Dutch in
1652, and was later forcibly taken over by the British in,
officially, 1806. The British first created a nominally
independent Union of South Africa in 1910; they then granted
the nation full independence in 1931. South Korea, on the
other hand, had always maintained independence since prehistoric periods until it was occupied by Japan in 1910, after
the First Sino-Japanese Wars of 1894 and 1895 and the RussoJapanese War of 1904 to 1905. Japan maintained control over
the united country until it surrendered to Soviet and
American forces at the end of World War II in 1945.
Though the two countries achieved independence
within, roughly, the same few decades, the historical contexts
behind the reason for independence and the development
after independence differ drastically. Furthermore, the
development of the peoples themselves differs drastically as
well. In South Korea, the Korean people had always
maintained a sense of unity and homogeneity throughout
Japanese occupation—and indeed, had maintained a sense of
hostility against the Japanese. Contrastingly, the South
African people had always been either formally or informally
segregated along racial, ethnic, and economic lines: blacks,
Afrikaners and whites had always been at odds. These
differences between the two countries contribute to distinct
ideologies, strategies for economic growth, models for social
development, processes for legitimizing institutions, legal
systems and so forth. These differences will be highlighted
below and at the conclusion to the section.
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A. SOUTH AFRICA, CASE STUDY
South Africa achieved independence from Britain in
1931, and soon thereafter the National Party took control of
the government in 1948.36 This party formally adopted a
policy of “apartheid”—separateness—that segregated the
country into its different racial and ethnic groups: blacks,
whites (Europeans), and Afrikaners (descendants from the
mainly white Dutch settlers whose mother tongue is
Afrikaans, a mix of a southern Dutch dialect, Indonesian, and
other African tongues brought over by slaves from Indonesia
and Madagascar). Apartheid, government-institutionalized
segregation, led to an incredibly divisive and abusive public
state of affairs that benefitted the white population at the
expense of the black population. Whites enjoyed the highest
standard of living in all of Africa, a standard comparable to
the advanced Western societies, while the blacks were
intensively disadvantaged in every sector: health, education,
income, housing, et cetera. In all, the “system bred
intolerance, a culture of violence, and lack of respect for life
and, indeed, rights in general.”37
Throughout apartheid, domestic national movements
(e.g., the African National Congress, also known as the
“ANC”),
international
movements
through
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), and governments
and populations from across the world criticized and
oftentimes violently protested the South Africans’ policies.38

36South

Africa Country Profile, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-14094760 (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
37 Jeremy Sarkin, The Development of a Human Rights Culture in South Africa,
20 HUMAN RTS. Q. 628, 628 (1998).
38 South Africa Country Profile, supra note 36; Sarkin, supra note 37, at 660.
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Indeed, many governments such as the United States also put
in place heavy economic sanctions against South Africa in an
effort to destabilize, or at the very least paralyze, the country’s
economy. Because of this immense international pressure and
vigilance which continued for a period of more than 40 years,
the South African government began to negotiate with
liberation movements over policies that would aid in the
transition of the country to a democracy.39
The process of transition began in 1990 when the
Constitutional Assembly (the “CA”), made up of 490 elected
members from the National Assembly and the Senate of
South Africa, set out to draft a new constitution that would
ensure public participation “to observe the democratic
principles of openness and inclusiveness.”40 The amount of
public participation achieved by the CA was commendable:
“over 1.7 million submissions, mainly petitions, were
received from citizens before a draft text was published . . . In
the subsequent drafting phase, the CA received over 1500
submissions and petitions.”41 The “Final Constitution” which
entered into force on February 4, 1997 contains a Bill of Rights
establishing certain political, socioeconomic, and children’s
rights, as well as a basic, fundamental respect for human
dignity.42
Significantly, the Constitution is justiciable: the
institution of the judiciary and its court system became
empowered, by new constitutional mandate, to reach the

Sarkin, supra note 37, at 631.
Id.
41 Id.
42 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC
chapter 2.
39
40

OF

SOUTH AFRICA May 8, 1996,
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substantive merits of cases and evaluate the fairness of the
law.43 Prior to the “Final Constitution,” judges had been seen
as “mere technicians” who had the expertise only to ensure
that procedure and technicalities were respected, while
parliamentarians were the supreme voices of the substance
and fairness of law.44 In particular, the establishment of the
Constitutional Court in February 1995 signaled the end of
parliamentary supremacy and the introduction of a true
constitutional democracy to a degree that would ensure the
respect of all constitutional human rights in all South African
courts.45 What makes this empowerment additionally
powerful is that the constitution outlines that the respect of
socioeconomic rights applies to relations between the state
and the citizen (a vertical protection) as well as between
citizens themselves (a horizontal protection).46 This means
that, in dealing with cases that directly implicate
constitutional law, the Constitutional Court has the power to
rule on government policy.47 Indeed, “[i]n the realm of overtly
‘political’ cases, the . . . Court has shown itself to be eager to
deliver decisions as quickly as possible,”48 and it “has shown
itself to be both a libertarian court and one that is at ease, to
some degree, with the job of striking down apartheid-era
statutes.”49 Problematically however, the criminal justice
system trails behind the Constitutional Court with regards to
ensuring the protection of human rights. Failed prosecutions

Sarkin, supra note 37, at 641.
Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 632.
47 Id. at 643.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 644.
43
44

2018 DOES INTERNATIONAL TRADE TRUMP HUMAN RIGHTS

321

have become the norm. It is a norm which “perpetuates a lack
of respect . . . for the rule of law” and which threatens the
judicial system in general.50
Nevertheless, there is hope of accountability for South
African courts and hope for the respect for human rights in
two forms. First, the provisions in the Constitutional Bill of
Rights
inherently
incorporate
the
international
understanding of human rights as outlined in the U.N.
Charter, the UDHR, the Marrakesh Agreement establishing
the WTO, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR. The Final Constitution
itself stipulates this specific relation between South African
law and customary and institutional international law:
“customary international law is law in the Republic unless it
is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.
When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer
any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is
consistent with international law over any alternative
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.”51 In
other words, customary international law–international
norms–is as lawful and legitimate in the domestic space as it
is in the international stage of law, and no court can subvert
this international law to the law of the Republic because both
are complementary. This means that, in theory, South African
courts will be held accountable to the international treaties
onto which they signed. Second, there is hope for the respect
for human rights because the South African Parliament itself
has implemented several human rights institutions to deal
with the social reformation of the South African people. These

Id.
THE CONSTITUTION
chapter 14.

50
51

OF THE

REPUBLIC

OF

SOUTH AFRICA May 8, 1996,
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include the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the
Human Rights Commission, the Land Restitution
Commission, the Public Protector, the Pan South African
Language Board, and the Gender Commission.52 These
provisions and institutions have been instrumental in
successfully navigating the end and transition from apartheid
to an era wherein a South African culture centered on human
rights is fostered and promoted.53
The Human Rights Commission in particular has
“dedicated itself to . . . monitoring and assessing the
observance of human rights . . . [and] addressing human
rights violations” by helping citizens seek effective legal
redress.54 It utilizes its “core operational programmes” to
achieve these objectives, including the Legal Services
Programme and the Research and Documentation
Programme.55 The former operates on a basis of complaintfiling by individual citizens; the program then investigates
the complaints by conducting public inquiries and issuing

Sarkin, supra note 37, at 640-41.
Id. at 662. Importantly, the South African government also signed in
1994 the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination; in 1995, it ratified the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, the Protocols of the Geneva Convention,
and, in 1996, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Id. at 635-36. This
demonstrates how significantly the South African government considered
its role in creating a revolutionary, expansively inclusive foundation for
the protection of human rights in its society.
54
Programmes, SOUTH AFRICA HUMAN RTS. COMMISSION,
https://www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/what-we-do (last visited Jan. 14,
2018).
55 Id.
52
53
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subpoenas, and it litigates in the instances where mediation
and negotiation fail.56 It produces a Trends Analysis Report
on an annual basis to “provide [to Parliament and the general
public] statistical information regarding the number of
complaints received, referred, and finalized by the
Commission [and] . . . a narrative analysis” accompanying the
statistics.57
Over the past six years, beginning in the 2012-13 fiscal
year, the number of complaints and enquiries (“cases”) has
averaged to 8,888.25 per year.58 The fiscal year for 2015-16 has
had the most number of cases since the 2011-12 fiscal year
(9,238 versus 11,363, respectively).59 The highest number of
complaints in the 2015-16 fiscal year—749 complaints, 16.06%
of total complaints—came from the category of the human
right to equality.60 The same holds true for 2014-15, though
the number of complaints is considerably lower: there were
493 complaints of violations in the category of the human
right to equality, 13.19% of the total number of complaints for
the fiscal year.61 The commission signals and emphasizes that
a significant number of complaints relate to the alleged
violation of the right to equality and that this number has

Programmes: Legal Services Unit, SOUTH AFRICA HUMAN RTS.
COMMISSION,_https://www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/what-wedo#mymodal1 (scroll to “Legal Services Unit (LSU)” and click the
hyperlink for “Read More”) (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
57 Id.
58 Annual Trends’ Analysis Report: 2015/2016 Financial Year, SOUTH
AFRICA_HUMAN_RTS._COMMISSION_11,_https://www.sahrc.org.za/hom
e/21/files/Annual_Trends_Analysis_%20Report_2015_16.pdf.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 23.
61 Id.
56
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been increasing over the past five to six years.62 The
commission further notes the following:
Despite the enactment of legislation [and the
codification of every citizen’s right to equality in Section 9(2),
9(3), 16(1), and 16(2) of the South African constitution], there
remain a number of considerable challenges in respect of the
achievement of equality in South Africa. Inequality and
discrimination remain a significant challenge to our
democracy. According to the Gini coefficient, as well as other
inequality measures, South Africa ranks as one of the most
unequal countries in the world. These disparities are largely
attributed to apartheid and its discriminatory laws and
practices.63
There is general consensus among scholars and
researchers in the field that the South African “inequality is
both a cause and consequence of the lack of enjoyment of
social and economic rights.”64 Most notably, “poverty and
inequality stand together, and they have a racial quality” that
stems from the long history of racial, ethnic, and gender
discrimination that was institutionally perpetuated in South
Africa for decades.65 Constitutional provisions seem to have
no traction against “half a century of post-apartheid political
leadership [that] has largely failed to change land and capital
ownership patterns, or bridge the huge socioeconomic divide

Id. at 24.
Id. at 25-26.
64 Id. at 31-33; Geoff Budlender, 20 Years of Democracy: The State of Human
Rights in South Africa, 25 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 439, 442 (2014).
65 Budlender, supra note 64, at 442.
62
63
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that is still predicated on race.”66 It was known from the
outset that the post-apartheid political leadership and the
corruption that ran rampant through that leadership
structure would be a mountainous road block for realizing
true change in the culture of human rights.67 However, apart
from the contemporary “kleptocrat president” and his
“depredations on the public purse,” today’s social tensions
also rise from “starving students living in crowded
circumstances and saddled with mounting debt,” the poor
living in townships who have never been able to take part in
the public infrastructure projects, the poor who have been
able to take advantage of government housing but who have
been left abandoned and devoid of opportunity in crumbling
structures on the outer rims of developed cities, and the “most
privileged in . . . society [who] persistently refuse to
acknowledge that their continuing privilege was achieved at
the expense of the dignity and wellbeing of their
compatriots.”68
The country has made much progress in its human
rights achievement, but continued progress forward must be
dictated by government policies and legal precedent that
would reconcile social frustrations. On the whole, the
demarcation between those who have and those who do not
have is endemic. This is perpetuated by the government. This

Ayesha Kajee, Even if Zuma Goes, South Africa Will Remain Divided, AL
JAZEERA_(Apr._3,_2017),_http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/
2017/04/zuma-south-africa-remain-divided-170403131452554.html.
67 Jeremy Sarkin, The Development of a Human Rights Culture in South Africa,
20 HUMAN RTS. Q. 628, 629 (1998); see also Joao Silva, Twenty Years After
Apartheid,_N.Y._TIMES:_LENS_(Apr._29,_2014),_https://lens.blogs.nytim
es.com/2014/04/29/twenty-years-after-apartheid/.
68 Kajee, supra note 66.
66
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demarcation seems insurmountable as it looms over all of
society, the root of violent protests that have been crippling
the country and threatening the stability of the legal system.
In short, structural apartheid persists, and the law in South
Africa has not lived up to its expectation.
B. SOUTH KOREA, CASE STUDY
From 1910 and throughout World War II, the Japanese
occupied Korea. Upon Japan’s surrender in 1945 to the Allied
Forces, Korea was divided at the 38th parallel, with the Soviet
troops occupying the northern half of the country and
American troops occupying the southern half.69 This
temporary line of division was selected somewhat arbitrarily,
because it did not conform to how the people saw themselves
organized
politically,
culturally,
historically,
or
70
traditionally. But with the development of the Cold War,
however, the two halves of the country developed
independently and along very different lines. The
independent Republic of Korea (South Korea) was
proclaimed in 1948, sparking the brutal three-year Korean
War, pitting the Chinese-backed North Koreans, against the
South Koreans, backed by the United Nations. The war never
officially ended; an armistice temporarily calling off fighting
was signed only by North Korea in 1953. Throughout this
period, South Korea had been significantly backed by the
United States which had shipped over economic, military,

South Korea Country Profile, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-pacific-15292674 (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
70 Amy Offner, Assistant Professor of History, University of Pennsylvania,
Lecture on Strategies of Containment in the Early Cold War (March 3,
2016).
69
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and political support. By the stalling of the war in 1953, the
whole country and nation of South Korean people was
ravaged almost to obliteration. There was a pressing need to
consolidate political power and create a platform and strategy
for massive economic development.
South Korea adopted an essentially democratic
constitution in 1948 when it proclaimed itself a republic. But
the constitution was abolished in 1960 when President
Sygnman Ree stepped down in response to massive student
uprisings calling electoral fraud.71 The people saw President
Ree’s government as a civic dictatorship that was forcibly
anti-communist and anti-democratic. The student uprisings
fueled the success of a military coup on May 16, 1961, which
established General Park Jung Hee as the head of state for the
Republic of Korea. Despite being a military dictatorship,
General Park declared a Third Republic in December 1963
and held elections for a new civilian government. After
General Park won the election, he implemented a third
constitution and simultaneously implemented programs for
massive industrial development.72
The resultant rapid economic growth and proliferation
of government policies aimed at supporting the growth
“undoubtedly had spill-over effects in improving the quality
of life of the people.”73 The President of the Korea

C.I. Eugene Kim, Emergency, Development and Human Rights: South Korea,
18 ASIAN SURVEY 363, 366 (1978).
72 South Korea Country Profile, supra note 69.
73 Kim, supra note 71, at 373. For details and a full report on the economic
development of South Korea, the policies implemented by the
government to facilitate social growth in tandem with economic
development, and a study of the country’s economic success, see also Larry
E. Westphal, The Republic of Korea’s Experience with Export-Led Industrial
71
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Development Institution at the time, Mahn Je Kim, wrote “the
Park government realized economic development as the key
to its own political success as well as to the establishment of
political stability and . . . the means for overcoming
negativism and frustration in the country.”74
At a minimum, increased economic production
provided Koreans with the opportunity to gain employment,
transferable production skills, improved communication
(e.g., telecommunications, roads, highways), access to
education, and greater individual economic welfare. Annual
population rates slowed because there was a decrease in
mortality and birth rates; these declines were in turn
associated with “better sanitation, public health services, and
medical care in the case of death rates, and, for birth rates,
with successful population planning programs and with
development.”75
Additionally, this rapid growth in economic
production did not mean the typical rift in income inequality.
Poverty levels decreased as a whole, though not
entirely.“[E]vidence of relatively limited public expenditure
for social and welfare purposes . . . indicate that redistributive
fiscal policy [was not] important in curbing inequality.”76 In
1982, South Korea spent much less than Japan and

Development, 6 WORLD DEV. 347, 350 (1978); Thomas Oatley, INT’L
POLITICAL ECONOMY 142-43 (5th ed. 2012); Paul W. Kuznets, An East Asian
Model of Development: Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, 36 ECON. DEV. &
CULTURAL CHANGE S11, S17-S19 (1988).
74 Mahn Je Kim, Kor. Dev. Inst. President, Presentation to the Symposium
on Korea and the Powers in the 1970’s: A Decade and Future Perspectives
of the Korean Econ. Dev., (Apr. 20-21, 1973)
75 Kuznets, supra note 73, at S14.
76 Id. at S15, S17.
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considerably less than Taiwan in housing amenities, social
security, and welfare: 10.5% compared to 12.6% and 32.5%,
respectively. This can be attributed to a substantial decrease
in labor surplus in the 1960s and 1970s, which led to real wage
increases that most greatly benefited those “at the bottom end
of the income scale.”77
Despite the increase in economic power, the South
Korean people had little opportunity to demand better
human rights. After the period of rapid economic
development, people lost freedom and democracy because of
the persistence of the authoritarian military government in
South Korea until 1992, tightly controlling everything from
working hours, to children’s education, to housing
arrangements based on workplace.78 In the late 1980s, South
Koreans still saw widespread violation of human rights, the
proliferation of government corruption, and the suppression
of the opposition to government rule.79 However, with the
rapid economic growth came a promising rapid growth in the
growing middle class’s sensitivity towards human rights;
they “tasted freedoms economically [and] began to press for
widened freedoms politically.” 80 In other words, this new
middle class was “acquiring an economic stake in political
stability,” and would use that stake to influence the political
situation that was becoming increasingly intolerable. From
the government’s perspective, this crisis of rising

Id. at S17; See also Soon-Won Kang, Democracy and Human Rights
Education in S. Kor., 38 Comp. Educ. 315, 319 (2002).
78 Kang, supra note 77, at 315-316.
79 David Black & Shona Bezanson, The Olympic Games, Human Rights and
Democratization: Lessons from Seoul and Implications for Beijing, 25 THIRD
WORLD Q. 1245, 1248 (2004).
80 Id. at 1248.
77
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expectations, when coupled with the assassination of General
Park in 1979 and the political vacuum of instability that
followed, proved to be a momentous challenge.
Scholars argue that the Olympic Games of 1988 became
a government tool to legitimize power over the South Korean
people in the eyes of the world. The government entered a bid
to host the 1988 Olympics in Seoul for multiple purposes.
First, the government sought to use the opportunity to bolster
its image of economic superiority, and display the South
Korean economic miracle to the world.81 Second, winning a
bid for the Games would legitimize the government in the
eyes of the world and serve as protection from North Korea.82
In effect, the increased scrutiny in the country from
international press and the increase in pressure from Korean
citizens for a change in political status had a “signal effect on
the pace and peacefulness of the transition” to a democratic
state.83 The Seoul Olympics were not the cause of
democratization and political change in South Korea, but it
certainly made all conditions for transition “ripe.”84
The political and legal situation in South Korea began
to change before and during the Olympics, and had its most
dramatic change in 1992 when the military dictatorship
officially ended. The new millennium ushered in a new era
for South Korea: President Kim Dae-Jung was awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize in 2000; Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Mon was
appointed the Secretary General of the United Nations in
2006; South Korea concluded a free-trade deal with the United

Id. at 1250.
Id.
83 Id. at 1254.
84 Id.
81
82
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States in 2007; and South Koreans elected their first female
president, Park Geun-hye, in 2012.85 The Constitution, as
amended in 1987, outlined the “rights and duties of citizens”
with regards to their dignity; pursuit of happiness; equality;
personal liberty; integrity; freedom of occupation, privacy,
religion, speech, press, and assembly; intellectual rights; and
the right to vote, education, work, environment, housing, and
health.86 Similar to the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of Korea
guarantees that “treaties duly concluded and promulgated
under the Constitution and generally recognized rules of
international law shall have the same force and effect of law
as domestic laws of the Republic of Korea.”87 Though current
international norms maintain “persuasive authority” over
Korean society and Korean courts of law,88 the constitutional
recognition of the legitimacy and enforceability of customary
international law will prove significant to the exercise of
judicial activism that has recently developed in South Korea
and, generally, to the development of the democratic legal
system in coming years.89 Coupled with the codification of the
supremacy of human rights, “[t]he making of the [South
Korean] Constitution . . . was a historic event, for it restored
political independence formally, while introducing a
democratic form of government for the first time in Korean

Id.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, Oct. 29, 1987.
87 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, Oct. 29, 1987, art. 6.
88 Tae-Ung Baik, Stabilizing Democracy and Human Rights Systems in South
Korea, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 877, 887 (2013).
89 See Marie Seong-Hak Kim, Travails of Judges: Courts and Constitutional
Authoritarianism in South Korea, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 601, 601-54 (2015).
85
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history.”90 The constitution allowed the government to
legitimize itself in the eyes of the world. Though it would take
a few decades to achieve the theoretical democracy and
protection of human rights laid out in the constitution after
the Park period ended,
it must be stressed that the Korean legal system,
as fraught with rampant political persecution
and human rights violations as it was, did not,
by any stretch, amount to an immoral legal
order mired in genocide, slavery, racial
discrimination, or the impudence of military
dictatorship waging a so-called dirty war
during which a massive number of people
disappeared.91
Indeed, the legal system struggled daily to maintain
the minimum amount of due process throughout that period
of most repressive authoritarian governmental rule.92 At the
end of the day, the “preservation by the courts of the basic
framework of legality” was essential to the transition of South
Korea to a democracy in 1987.93
Therefore, the most recent trend in South Korean
jurisprudence of focusing on substantive justice—the merits
of the law and of cases presented to the courts—rather than
legal procedural formalities is ironic. The Supreme Court and
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Constitutional Court have undertaken significant efforts to
undo much of the allegedly “legal” constitutional precedent
set in the 1960s and 1970s that came from strict adherence to
legal formalities.94 For example, in 2010 and 2013, both courts
each declared unconstitutional all Park-regime emergency
decrees, thereby setting aside all decisions rendered between
1974 and 1979 based on those decrees.95 Specifically, the
Courts emphasized in these contemporary decisions how
they see the courts of law “as the last bastion for the protection
of basic rights.”96 It was therefore imperative to undo
precedent that would prevent the courts of law from
protecting the basic rights of citizens harmed.97
More ironically, “these decisions . . . [corroborate] the .
. . claim that the people, the holder of pouvoir constituant, can
disregard the individual constitutional laws at will.”98 This
exposed the courts to criticism, but there is scholarship that
also understands the relationship of constitution and people
as one of mutual benefit, “reflexivity,” and mutual creation.99
That is to say, the amorphous, abstract entity of “the people”
does not merely create the constitution from the norms and
societal values that it holds. More so, the constitution gives
the people their very identity because the “making of a
constitution has the effect of calling a ‘people’ into
existence.”100 The people, therefore, must play an active role
in determining which constitutional provisions the legal and
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social system must disregard or demarcate. Their “political
and legal identity[, being] grounded in that very constitution”
must be reflected by the constitution.101 This provides support
for the recent trend towards “constitutionalism” that South
Korean courts have been undertaking. Nevertheless, the role
of the courts and “how [they] fare in the post-democratization
era” is still a live question and a relevant question to the
continued history of development in the country.102
South Korean courts have felt the difficulty in finding
the delicate balance that must be struck between too much
emphasis on legal formalities and the rule of law and too
much emphasis on natural law and human rights. “To strike
out against the tide [raises] the specter of futility; to swim
with the tide [raises] that of complicity;”103 and thus the courts
must find a middle ground between the public desire for
righteousness and justice and the substantive due process of
the rule of law.104 They are in a unique position, straddling
two exceedingly divergent eras of governmental rule and
social realities, and trying to find the median fertile ground
on which to defend, vis-à-vis the government and civil society,
the basic guarantee of protections for human rights codified
in Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution: “All citizens shall be
assured of human dignity and worth and have the right to
pursue happiness. It shall be the duty of the State to confirm
and guarantee the fundamental and inviolable human rights
of individuals.”105
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C. CONCLUSIONS ON THE CASE STUDIES
This section analyzed South African and South Korean
legal systems in the context of each respective country’s
historical, political, economic, and social development to
supplement the quantitative findings of the previous section.
Quantitatively, no correlation was found between growing
economic power (trade agreements) and growing human
rights protections. The qualitative analyses enlightened these
results by showing the contemporary complexities in South
African and South Korean society. Both countries underwent
unique periods of transition in the 1980s and 1990s that would
dictate progress, or lack thereof, in the following decades. In
other words, both countries’ government history has proved
problematic to the development of sophisticated, trusted legal
systems. Nevertheless, reforms in the respective constitutions
and respective Supreme and Constitutional Courts, as well as
heavy international attention and academic scholarship, give
promising hope for the future that human rights protections
will continue to be prioritized and that repressive, oppressive
past policies will plummet.
V.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

This article was meant to study how well trade regimes
and legal systems fare in the protection of human rights in
South Africa compared with South Korea. The first half of the
article developed a quantitatively analytical study that
tracked the growth of South Africa’s and South Korea’s trade
regime measured against each country’s measurement for
human rights protections. The study was inconclusive; the
analysis put forth an x-coefficient of 0, meaning there was no
correlation between how these countries developed

336

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 25

economically and how their human rights outcomes changed
because of the economic development.
Because of this statistical aberration, I undertook a
qualitative analysis in the second half of the article to study
the historical development of each country, looking at the
most recent history of political reform, economic
development, social change, and legal restructuring. The
results of the qualitative analysis proved more enlightening:
for both South Africa and South Korea, deep-seeded
government mistrust, social inequalities, and historical legal
ineffectiveness and inefficiency pose important contemporary
challenges to the protection of human rights.
For South Africa specifically, the government and its
institutions must address the ubiquitous and grave social
tensions that are currently pushing civil society to the brink
of a rift reminiscent of the dark days of apartheid. By
remedying the social disunity currently pervading everyday
life, the government will realize the same human rights
protections ensured by the 1994 Constitution, those which
make the Rainbow Nation famously inclusive and its
constitution exemplary. In fact, constitutionalism may prove
to be the “mechanism for balancing this requirement of unity
with the unavoidable diversity of interests, values, and
cultures [of black, Afrikaans, and white] that pervade” the
South African society.106 For South Korea, the government
must allow the high courts to effectively rule over precedent
from its own dark era under the authoritarian dictatorship of
General Park, and the courts must do so in a way that balances
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society’s cry for substantive justice with the legal formalities
of rule of law and due process: “the unity presupposed by a
constitutional order is never static. It is a product of ceaseless
dialogue.”107 Additionally, the academic world must continue
to author studies investigating this development of legal
human rights protections in South Korea; the field needs more
analysis and the South Korean people’s cry for increased
democracy and human rights protections needs international
attention.
Further, international institutions have a role to play in
ensuring that these countries, and all countries party to
international treaties focusing on human rights and trade,
actualize their obligations, responsibilities, and promises
under the treaties. Though international organizations lack
police power, the collective power of its party members is a
useful tool to effect positive change in human rights
obligations across the world. Such organizations and
coordinated party-member action paralyzed the South
African economy during apartheid in the mid-20th century
and helped South Koreans push for greater democratic
freedoms at the end of the 20th century. There is much
unrealized international power in these bodies; and it is a
power which can be easily utilized to achieve goals in the area
of human rights and economic development that all countries
party to them want to achieve.
Trade is a mechanism for achieving equalized social
interactions if properly and constructively channeled. Trade
is essential to the protection of human rights because “trade
assists countries and people to meet the livelihood supplies”
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that embody economic, social, and cultural rights.108
Importantly, the growth of trade opportunities and profits
must be complemented by an effective legal system which
would be the ultimate champion and defender of every
human’s most basic rights. The first steps towards remedying
the social status quo must come from the executive; the
process must be safeguarded by the judiciary; and the
perpetuation of profit can be ensured by a happy, protected,
productive populace. There is an “indirect but inherent
linkage between [all three of] them,” and South Africa and
South Korea are in a unique position to capitalize on the
benefits of each.109
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